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A SHARED VALUES APPROACH TO JURISDICTIONAL
CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
By
BERNHARD GROSSFELD* AND C. PAUL ROGERS**
I. INTRODUCTION
DISCUSSIONS of multinational economic law often refer to the extraterrito-
rial aspects of domestic law, such as the antitrust and securities laws of a
country. Difficulties arise when a country attempts to apply its domestic
laws to acts done abroad. For example, the United States antitrust laws
might well be applied to a European price-fixing cartel engaged in
exporting goods to the United States. Such situations engender interna-
tional tensions beyond the economic, political and diplomatic clashes we
are accustomed to in traditional conflict of laws circumstances.
The international debate started and now focuses upon the subject-
matter jurisdictional standards of United States courts in enforcing
American antitrust and securities laws abroad.' It is disconcerting that the
tensions are particularly acute between the United States and its liberal
democratic allies. Interestingly, the initial conflict occurred between the
United States and the United Kingdom, countries with a history of close
cultural and political ties.2
That the United States is in the centre of the storm is not surprising.
Historically, the concept of protection of a free market economy, while
originating in European legal systems, 3 has been most intensively pursued
in the United States. 4 Further, American securities laws initiated a pattern
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1. See e.g. Norton, "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of US Antitrust and Securities Laws" (1979) 28
I.C.L.Q. 575; Sornarajah, "The Extraterritorial Enforcement of US Antitrust Laws: Conflict and
Compromise" (1982) 31 IC.L.Q. 127.
2. See United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), and British
Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. [19531 Ch. 19 (CA); [19551 Ch. 37.
3. Grossfeld, "Zur Kartellrechtsdiskussion vor dem erstem Weltkrieg", in Coing/Wilhelm (Eds.),
Wissenschaft und Kodifikation des Privatrechts im 19. Jahrhundert (1979), Vol.4, p. 25 5 .
4. See e.g. W. Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America (1965); H. Thorelli, Federal Antitrust
Policy (1959).
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of corporate governance that has only recently been followed in other legal
systems.5 Likewise, the problems of international application of these
kinds of laws were first considered in United States courts. 6 Beyond these
historical factors the political and economic strength of the United States
gives its legal concepts wider ranging impact internationally.
In addition, the American methods of enforcement are viewed by other
countries as particularly aggressive. 7 The pervasive use of private lawsuits
is abhorred abroad. Commonplace aspects of the American judicial system
such as liberal pre-trial discovery, punitive and treble damages, contin-
gency fee arrangements and the defendant's role as a witness differ from
other common and civil law systems and are therefore viewed with
suspicion. The American jury system, under which jurors serve as the
arbiters of facts and control the granting and the amount of money
damages, is viewed as inherently biased in favour of the private American
plaintiff.
Lord Denning expressed this common sentiment in Smith Kline and
French Laboratories Ltd. v. Bloch8 in the Court of Appeal:
As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can
only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune. At no cost to himself and
at no risk of having to pay anything to the other side. The lawyers there will conduct
the case "on spec" as we say-or on a "contingency fee" as they say. The lawyers will
charge the litigant nothing for their services but instead they will take 40 per cent. of
the damages-if they win the case in court-or out of court on a settlement. If they
lose, the litigant will have nothing to pay to the other side. The courts in the United
States have no such costs deterrent as we have. There is also in the United States a
right to trial by jury. These are prone to award fabulous damages. They are notoriously
sympathetic and know that the lawyers will take their 40 per cent. before the plaintiff
gets anything. All this means that the defendant can be readily forced into a
settlement. The plaintiff holds all the cards.
Similar reactions can be found in the legal literature of other Western
nations.
9
These countries also resent what they regard as the use of private suits to
enforce American public and economic policies abroad. The American
system which encourages the private redress of wrongs of its citizenry
5. See Tunc, "A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law and Securities Regulation" (1982)
130 U.Pa.L.Rev. 757, at p.759.
6. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-445 (2d Cir. 1945); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
7. Grossfeld, "Probleme der Rechtsvergleichung im Verhailtnis Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika-
Deutschland" (1975) 39 RabelsZ. 5.
8. Lord Denning in Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd. and Another v. Bloch, The Times, May
17, 1982 (1980 S No.6514 (Transcript: Association) May 13, 1982).
9. Cf. Von HOlsen, "Gebrauch und Missbrauch US-amerikanischer 'pre-trial discovery' und die





through the judiciary often has no corollary in other countries.' 0 They
blame the US generated private suit as circumventing their traditional
defences against foreign political or administrative intervention. The
private suit is regarded as State activity hidden under the rubric of private
action." It is not that foreign countries misunderstand the American
values which promote the private litigant; it is that they resent the
exportation of the methods of American enforcement through "private
attorneys general". The result is a clash of American legal institutions with
foreign legal systems and their underlying values. 12
The foreign defensive reactions to American extraterritoriality are thus
understandable and are in fact invited by the operation of the American
legal system. American law recognises the defences of foreign
compulsion, 13 Act of State 14 and sovereign immunity. 15 American law
does not, however, recognise as a legal defence foreign concepts, such as
informal rules, that are unfamiliar to the American socio-legal culture.'
6
The result is that citizens of a liberal (democratic) State have fewer
defences to an American lawsuit than those of States of paramount
government control. Citizens of State controlled countries are likely to be
insulated from American litigation by claiming the US created defences of
foreign compulsion and the like even though the values and norms of the
countrie are disparate. Also, the relative openness of judicial systems in
democratic countries presents more opportunities for conflict than legal
systems that are closed to foreign concerns. The result is greater opposition
to American antitrust and securities laws in those States most closely
aligned ideologically to the United States, for example, England, Canada
and Australia, than in non-democratic nations where little thought is given
to the extraterritorial application of American laws. Thus, a paradox arises
10. Grossfeld, op. cit. supra n.7, at p.14.
11. Cf. Grossfeld, "Multinationale Korporationen im Internationalen Steuerrecht" (1978) 18 Berichte
der Deutschen Gesellschaftfiir Vdlkerrecht 72, at p.122.
12. See Griffin, "The Incompatibility of International Accommodation and Private Attorneys General"
(1982) 14 Case W. Res. J. Int. L. 31; cf. Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
13. See e.g. Ricks, "International Law-Antitrust Law-mmunities to Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Law" (1978) 12 J. Int. & Econ. L. 487; Meal, "Governmental Compulsion As a
Defense Under United States and European Community Antitrust Law" (1981) 20 Colum. J. Transnat. L.
51.
14. See e.g. Timberg, "Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycott and
Economic Coercion" (1979) 6 Revue Suisse du droit international de la concurrence 20; International
Association of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
15. See e.g. Cooper,'Act of State and Sovereign Immunity: Further Inquiry" (1980) 11 Loy. U. Chi. L.
J. 193; Note, "The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to International Cartels Involving Foreign
Governments" (1982) 91 Yale L.J. 765.
16. See e.g. Craig, "Application of Trading with the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by
Americans: Reflections on Fruehaufv. Massardy" (1970) 83 Harv. L. Rev. 579, at p.596.
OCTOBER 1983]
International and Comparative Law Quarterly
whereby the constituents of American allies are most directly affected by
the extraterritoriality of the American legal system.
The initial consequence is that the liberal States feel pressured to invent
defence mechanisms that are cognisable in the American legal system.
These defences include barring plaintiffs' access to material information
and refusing to enforce US judgments. It is not surprising that foreign
blocking statutes are epidemic.17 They are simply home-grown remedies
against a perceived invasion of the sanctity of the promulgating State's
legal structure. The statutes are in reality generated by the US and are a
natural, predictable consequence of the US approach to subject-matter
jurisdiction.
If these developments continue, the free world will soon be divided
between States asserting extraterritorial application of their laws and
States reacting with reciprocal intensity. Many jurisdictions, including
West Germany1 8 and the European Economic Community, 19 are heavily
influenced by the American example of liberal extraterritorial claims.
Others are following the Canadian and Dutch example with blocking
statutes.2 0 In the long run most countries may, depending on the issue and
the national interest involved, stand on both sides of the dispute. For
example, the US Congress has considered enacting its own blocking statute
to protect its populace against the asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction of
foreign laws.2 ' The consequences of these developments in international
economic law are inherently destructive and may lead to a disruption,
politically and legally, of the international community, particularly
between countries sharing similar ideologies and values.
The simplest solution to the problems is to look first to foreign
jurisdictions to seek a more co-operative attitude. There is little hope,
given the current state of affairs, that foreign States, already on the
defensive, will take the first step to adopt such an attitude. Another
approach may be more successful though more painful to the United
17. Blocking statutes are laws designed to take advantage of the foreign government compulsion dcfcnce
by prohibiting such things as disclosure, copying and inspection or removal of documents located in the
territory of the enacting State in compliance with orders of foreign authorities. See e.g.: United
Kingdon-Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980; France-Law No.80-538 of July 16, 198) [19801 J.O.
1799. superseding Law No.68-678 of July 26. 1968 11968] J.O. 7267: South Africa-Protection of
Businesses Act, Act 99 of 1978, as amended by the Protection of Businesses (Amendment) Act, Act 114 of
1980. See also Comment, "Shortening the Long Arm of American Antitrust Jurisdiction: Extraterritorial-
ity and the Foreign Blocking Statutes" (1982) 28 Loy.L.Rev. 213: Note. "Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and
Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation" (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 612.
18. S.98, subs.(2), German Statute on the Restriction of Trade (Gesetz gegen Wetbewerbsbeschriink.
ungen).
19. Art.85, EEC Treaty; cf. Vagts, "A Turnaround in Extraterritoriality" (1982) 76 A.J.I.L. 591.
20. See supra n.17, and accompanying text.
21. See S.1592, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R.4339, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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States: if the paradox began domestically through broad jurisdictional
claims for a sovereign law, then arguably the solution for the paradox
caused thereby should also start at home by taking foreign interests more
seriously at the outset. The US Supreme Court strongly voiced this attitude
in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts . . . . We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms,
governed by our laws and resolved in our courts.
2 2
However, in practice US courts have frequently paid little more than lip
service to the Zapata language, and have not sufficiently focused upon or
understood foreign interests.23
11. POSSIBLE APPROACHES
THE paradox has increasingly generated diplomatic attempts at accords
beginning with the Rogers-Fulton agreement in 195924 and including the
American-German treaty of co-operation about restrictive trade
practices 25 and most recently the American-Australian treaty. 26 Further
attempts have occurred in the United Nations through the newly adopted,
multilaterally agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices Proclamation. 27 The treaties and accords,
however, do not yet cover important American trading partners such as the
UK and France. The United Nations declarations are not intended to be
legally binding and fail to cover all extraterritorial legal problems. Conflicts
in legal systems differ depending upon the substantive law involved; the
diplomatic accords, treaties and United Nations proclamations are either
22. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
23. See e.g. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir.
1972).
24. See Campbell, "The Canada-United States Antitrust Notification and Consultation Procedure"
(1978) 56 Can. B. Rev. 659; Henry, "The United States Antitrust Laws: Canadian Viewpoint" 11970] Can.
Y.B.I.L. 249.
25. See US-German Agreement on Antitrust Co-operation (1977) It J. W. Trade L. 95.
26. On June 29, 1982, an agreement between the US and Australia concerning principles of antitrust
enforcement was initiated by Attorneys General Smith and Durack. Art. I of the agreement provides for
notification by each country of policy changes or investigations which would have an impact on the other.
Art.2 establishes consultation procedures for conflicts in law, policy or national intcrest" The Australian
Government may request written clarification of enforcement intentions through FTC proceedings, and the
Department of Justice may participate by reporting the outcome of any consultation procedures in private
antitrust suits which concern Australian policy or law. Text of Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Australia Relation to Cooperation of [sicl Antitrust
Matters, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 36 (July 1, 1982). See also 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 1081 (May 20, 1982).
27. Restrictive Business Practices Code, UN Doc. TD/RBP/Conf./10/Rev.1 (1980).
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non-specific in nature or cover only antitrust or competition principles.
Although worthwhile, they do not appear to be a panacea.
Traditionally, in the absence of diplomatic co-operation, the judiciary
alone is confronted with the resolution of the paradox. In the United
States, the Alcoa effects test has in large measure shaped the courts'
approach to extraterritoriality. 28  More recently, however, American
courts have viewed the effects test as a sometimes unwarranted intrusion
upon foreign sovereignty and have resorted to an attempted balancing of
competing interests. 29 Yet American courts have disagreed both as to the
standards to be applied and the methodology of the standard. 30 The
balancing approach involves a weighing of interests on international,
national and litigant scales. 3' The result thus often seems arbitrary and has
been described by the Ninth Circuit as a "judicial nightmare", 32 and by a
District Court as an "unanswerable enigma". 33 Further, an approach
which requires an American judge to trade off foreign interests with
United States interests in a suit in which the plaintiff is typically American
and the defendant typically foreign is inherently suspect.
34
The interest analysis approach was originally conceived for internal
conflicts, i.e. States within the United States, where a much greater degree
of homogeneity results in a more accurate appraisal of the other State's
interest. The value of interest analysis wanes when it is applied to conflict
of laws internationally. Then one is bound to view the foreign interests
within the confines of his or her own legal system, resulting in a distorted
perception of the foreign interest. 35 Further attempts to improve the
present methods and to provide a workable, manageable structural
analysis are greatly needed.
Of course, all conflict of laws issues, whether domestic or international,
involve an interest analysis. Competing interests are inherent in any
28. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
29. Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
30. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1295 (7th Cir. 1980).
31. See Rosenfield, "Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach"
(1976) 28 Stan.L.Rev. 1005.
32. Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1975); cf. Lidcritz, "Gerhard Kegel und
das deutsche internationale Privatrecht" (1982) 46 RabelZ. 475, at p.484.
33. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 741 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
34. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co. (No.50, 827, Santa Fe County, New Mexico, 1978),
affd. 629 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1980), reh. denied, 1980, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981); cf. In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
35. Cf. Goble, "Nature, Man and Law" (1955) 41 A.B.A.J. 403, reprinted in Henson, Landmarks of
Law (1960), p.36. For a recent critique of the American Law Institute's current attempts to redraft the




adversary process in law; in the international context, both private and
governmental interests conflict in varying degrees. But it would be helpful
to structure the analysis so that there are different levels of analysis for
different levels of interest. Such a systematic approach would help to
localise the concrete interests of a particular conflict situation and provide
the parameters for detailed, focused analysis.
The issues we are concerned with arise in many contexts involving
different fields of law. The problems range from bank secrecy to
testimonial privileges, to the prohibition of rendering legal services by local
lawyers, and to the disclosure of documents. Each issue obtains its
substance from its particular legal environment. It would be somewhat
reckless to take on each problem here. We intend to separate the issues
and begin the discussion with a finite problem-the relevance of foreign
bank secrecy laws as a defence to discovery orders in an American court.
The choice is justified because the first foreign blocking provisions resulted
from laws of this nature.
III. FOREIGN MANDATORY RULES
THE threshold question is whether the foreign bank secrecy law can be
applied as law, as occurs for example with foreign tort law, or whether it
can merely be used to demonstrate factual impossibility or hardship of
performance. That is, will the court from which the discovery order
emanates give full recognition to a foreign law which prohibits the
exportation of bank documents or evidence and regards non-compliance
with a discovery order as justified on that basis, or will it simply consider
the foreign law as a possible factual barrier to document production? Two
levels of analysis are mandated. In the first instance the interests of
legislatures must be compared; the second focuses more on individual
burdens.
Thus far American courts have tended to disregard the first possibility
and focus on the second. For example, the Tenth Circuit position is that
"foreign law may not control local law". 3 6 This position may stem from a
general distrust of foreign governmental claims and foreign penal laws.
3 7
As Lord Mansfield stated: "No country ever takes notice of the revenue
laws of another country." 38 The US Supreme Court observed in an early
36. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096
(1976). For a clear distinction, see Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), Tent.
Draft No.3 (1982), sec.420, comment (f).
37. See E. Scoles and P. Hay, Conflict of Laws (1982), p.
75
.
38. Holman v. Johnson (1775) 98 E.R. 1120 (KB).
OCTOBER 1983]
938 International and Comparatite Law Quarterly [VOL. 32
decision that "the courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another". 39 The reasons for the distrust may arise from the more territorial
nature ofthese laws as compared with private laws. More important,
courts are uncertain of the values expressed by foreign governmental
claims and penal laws. But these concerns have lessened both in the United
States 40 and in Europe, 4 1 because nations are more aware of the possibility
of shared values with foreign States and recognise that these values may be
expressed even in laws generally characterised as mandatory.
The rigid barriers against the application of foreign mandatory laws
expressing governmental interests have been under attack in Europe
during the last 20 years.42 For example, the West German Federal Court
voided an insurance contract that violated a Nigerian statute prohibiting
the export of native artifacts.4 3 The transport of the artifacts was insured
by a German insurance company. German law was applicable through a
choice of law clause in the contract. The court concluded that there was no
insurable interest because the transport itself was illegal. The finding of
illegality was technically based on West German public policy, 44 but the
interpretation of the court was sensitive to international concerns and to
Nigerian interests. The court stated that
the circumvention of such a protective [Nigerian] statute must be regarded as
reprehensible; it contradicts the interests of all people in the preservation of their
cultural heritage in its original environment, an interest that according to modern
standards must be generally respected. Certain basic convictions exist within the
community of nations concerning the right of each country to protect its cultural
heritage and regarding as reprehensible practices which interfere with this heritage;
accordingly these practices must be prevented.
4 5
Earlier, the same court expressed its willingness to apply American
embargo rules in so far as these rules expressed values also held in West
46Germany.
The West German approach towards foreign mandatory laws is gaining
support.47 Article 7 of the proposed European Convention on the Law
39. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66, 123 (1825).
40. See e.g. Cohen, "Nonenforcement of Foreign Tax Laws" (1970) 11 Harv.lnt.L.J. 1; Dachs,
"Enforcement of Foreign Tax Judgments in the United States" (1980) 14 JLint. L. & Econ. L. 291.
41. Grossfeld, op. cit. supra n.l, at p.146.
42. Grossfeld, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Wirtschaftsrechts (1975), p.
95
.
43. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 59, 82.
44. S. 138, German Civil Code (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch).
45. BGHZ 59, supra n.43, at p.85.
46. Ibid. p. 167; [ 1962] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1437:
47. Heini, "Die Anwendung wirtschaftlichcr Zwangsmassnahmen im Internationalen Privatrccht"
(1982) 22 Berichte der Deutschen Geselschaffiir Vlkerrecht 37. But cf. Grossfeld, op. cit. supra n. 1 I.
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Applicable to Contract Obligations provides, under the heading "Manda-
tory Laws":
48
1. When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to
the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a close
connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be
applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering whether to give
effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to
the consequences of their application or non-application.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of the rules of the law of the
forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise
applicable to the contract.
The mandatory rules referred to above contain domestic values that are
so strong as to make the norm of the rule compulsory in nature even if a
legal relationship may be governed by the law of another country.
Application of mandatory rules cannot be avoided by choice of law clauses
because of the rule country's overriding interest in the execution of the
mandatory rule. The interests of the host country are so paramount that it
is unwilling to defer the rule's application to normal choice of law
mechanics.
With this background it is not surprising that European commentators
favour application of foreign antitrust law by domestic courts. A leading
German commentator has stated that "as a general rule foreign antitrust
law is applicable whether or not it serves private purposes". 49 This
amounts to a full recognition of applicability of foreign antitrust laws.
The deference to foreign mandatory law has at least some merit. Where
nations share common values, the manner of expressing these values
through law should not be determinative. The nature of the characterisa-
tion should not be the focus; rather the inquiry should focus on whether the
law expresses typical international interests rather than local chauvinistic
values. In other words, the decisive -factor should be whether the
mandatory rule expresses values shared in common and which the
receiving country is itself willing to protect. The search for similarities in
values, even expressed differently, and an understanding of the foreign
environment should take precedence over superficial differences.
IV. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
THE solutions found where a claim of testimonial privilege based on foreign
48. (1980) XIX I.L.M. 1492. See also Schultsz, "Dutch Antecedents and Parallels to Article 7 of the
EEC Contracts Convention of 1980" (1983) 47 RabelsZ. 267.
49. Rchbinder, in Gesetz gegen Wetbewerbsbeschriinkungen (Immenga and Mestmacker (Eds.) 1982),
chap.7, s.98, subs.(2), No.273.
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law is asserted are illustrative. A conflict of this nature arises when the
evidentiary rule of the forum differs from another jurisdiction, such as
often occurs with the privilege against disclosure of confidential
information. 50 Where the conflict arises domestically within the United
States the interests of three jurisdictions may be involved-that of the
State whose law governs the underlying claim, the State having the most
significant relationship with the substance of the testimony, and the forum
State. 51 The Restatement approach, which has heavily influenced the
courts,52 focuses upon which forum has the most significant relationship
with the communication which is the subject of the asserted privilege.
53
Where the privilege claimed is based on the law of another country,
similar interests are involved. Article 11 of the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters uncondition-
ally entitles a witness to claim all the privileges available under the
domestic law of the State of execution (where the testimony is sought).
54
The Hague Convention approach reflects the shared values approach
because it recognises foreign standards which are shared by nations.
Further,. the Hague Convention incorporates a concept of territoriality.
Quite recently, the European Court of Justice adopted a similar approach
when faced with an attorney-client privilege question under European
Community law. 55 Although there was no statutory foundation for it, the
Court nevertheless recognised the privilege because it expressed values
that all Member States held in common. The Court emphasised that the
independence and ethical responsibilities of lawyers were similar through-
out the European Community as a consequence of a common, shared legal
tradition 56
Similar considerations govern the recognition of foreign judgments. The
liberal recognition concept depends on whether the foreign procedure and
foreign law correspond by and large to the local value system.57 Judge
Higginbotham characterised this concept of recognition as follows:
Where, as here, the rendering forum's system of jurisprudence has been a model for
other countries in the free world, and whose judges are of unquestioned integrity
50. Ibid. No.272.
51. See E. Scoles and P. Hay, op. cit. supra n.37, at p.397.
52. See also ibid. pp.397-400.
53. Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws (1971), secs.138, 139.
54. March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No.7444.
55. AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the EC, Case 155/7911982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264; F.S.R. 474; The
Times, May 20, 1982.
56. The approach could presumably be extended to include lawyers outside the European Community,
including American attorneys, who represent similar legal traditions.




independent of the political winds of the moment, the jud.ment rendered is entitled to
a more ministerial, less technocratic recognition process.
°
V. FOREIGN BANK SECRECY LAWS
ARGUABLY the shared value approach is valid with respect to conflicts
generated by foreign bank secrecy laws. The foreign law, of course, is not
to be respected if it is exclusively directed against parties outside the
jurisdiction of the foreign State. For example, Article 273 of the Swiss
Criminal Code prohibits the giving of information only to non-Swiss
authorities. 59 The West German Bundesfinanzhof (the highest German
court in taxation matters) declared that "no other State must recognise the
effects of this Swiss penal provision" 60 because Switzerland cannot expect
another country to follow rules of law that are applied discriminatorily
against foreign States.
In addition, foreign bank secrecy laws should only be applied as law to
the extent they are applied as law in the foreign country itself. Bank
secrecy which is not a defence to local investigatory procedures should not
bar foreign authorities from proceeding. In United States v. Field6 ' the
defendant sought to prevent a US grand jury from obtaining information in
the Cayman Islands that would have been obtainable by officials there for
their own investigatory purposes. The Fifth Circuit, in denying the
defence, held that
[s]ince the general rule appears to be that for domestic investigations such information
would be obtainable, we find it difficult to understand how the bank's customers' rights
of privacy would be significantly infringed simply because the investigating body is a
foreign tribunal.62
Only recently the Eleventh Circuit took a similar position with respect to
the Bahamian bank secrecy law:
It is incongruous to suggest that a United States court afford greater protection to the
customers' right of privacy than would a Bahamian court simply because this is a
foreign tribunal.
6 3
Apart from these principles, foreign bank secrecy laws should be
recognised as law when they correspond to similar provisions in the forum
country's law. Presumably, the similarity would reflect shared values in the
58. Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
59. Bindschedler, Der strafrechtliche Schutz wirtschaftlicher Geheimnisse (1981).
60. Recht des Internationalen Wirtschaft (1982), p.176.
61. 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
62. Ibid. p.408; see United States v. First National City Bank, 399 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1972).
63. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1391 (1lth Cir.
1982).
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two legal systems. Small deviations reflecting local peculiarities should not
disturb the recognition of the foreign law.
The final situation presents the hardest choices. It occurs when the
foreign secrecy law has no forum State counterpart or goes substantially
beyond the forum State's laws. Initially, it would appear that shared value
analysis would bar application of the foreign law since no counterpart as an
expression of a shared value exists. But the shared value analysis should
not end there because the lack of a statutory counterpart does not
necessarily preclude the existence of shared value systems. The analysis
should focus upon whether changing circumstances in the forum State
would produce a similar reaction within the existing values of that State.
That is, if the foreign law were transferred to the American system, would
it be thought of as possibly compatible with that system or would it be
rejected as inconsistent with basic precepts of the domestic law? Purely
chauvinistic values would not be tolerated but institutional reactions which
could conceivably mirror that of the forum State would be applied.
The shared value approach merely provides a structural framework for
analysis of the hard cases. 64 It is not definitive in nature because it is
non-specific, 65 discretionary and does not totally insulate the forum judge
from an interest analysis which must consider the interest (i.e. values) of a
foreign State. For example, the Second Circuit in Trade Development
Bank v. Continental Insurance Co.66 upheld a defence based upon a Swiss
bank secrecy statute because the information sought was of minor
importance to the plaintiff. 67 Thus, recourse to the more traditional
interest analysis cannot be completely avoided and may often facilitate a
conflict of laws resolution where the interests of one party are clearly
64. The practical constraint of the legislative process on a shared values (or interest analysis) approach
should not be overlooked. That is, a court attempting to determine whether foreign law should be applied
may not have the authority to supersede its own law because of the legislative mandate under which it is
working. Thus, even though a shared values approach might otherwise result in recognition of the foreign
law, legislatively imposed restrictions may preclude its operation. Courts in Western countries are not
independent of their legislatures; therefore we should not expect too much from our judicial systems in
resolving legal conflicts.
65. The non-specificity in identifying and analysing values may pose real problems in some jurisdictions.
For example, a court utilising the shared values approach may focus on procedural rather than substantive
differences. An English court faced with an American private treble damage antitrust action may decline to
apply American law because of its aversion to the private enforcement of laws perpetuated by the
American legal system. If the same court focused on the substance of the lawsuit, the shared values of both
countries in promoting competition would be paramount and the foreign (American) law would be applied.
In that situation it should be obvious that the values shared in the substantive law (promotion of
competition, etc.) are more significant than the procedural disparities of enforcement.
66. 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972).
67. See generally SEC v. Banca Della Suizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also




disproportionate to the interests of the country whose law causes the
conflict. Another exception should be made if the foreign bank law was
primarily adopted for foreign transactions which circumvent laws of a given
State. The history and tradition of the foreign bank secrecy law would be of
importance in this context.68
VI. SHARED VALUES AND THE INTEREST ANALYSIS
As noted, a shared values approach inherently gives greater deference to
foreign mandatory law than does an interest analysis; it thus may
frequently be outcome-determinative. The shared values approach does
not insulate the court from evaluating the interests of the foreign State. It
does, however, shift the court's initial focus from weighing the interest
involved to considering the values underlying the foreign law. If similar
values are found, the rationale for refusing to apply the foreign law
diminishes profoundly unless the foreign interest in the matter before the
court is insubstantial compared with the interest of the forum State. The
balancing of interests cannot be avoided but the emphasis on shared values
assures that the foreign law interests are not as likely to receive short shrift
as under a traditional interest analysis.
It is likely that a finding of shared values would influence a court's
subsequent interest analysis. That is, a judicial determination that the
foreign mandatory law expressed values shared by the forum jurisdiction,
even though the laws of the two States differed, would seemingly make it
more difficult for the court then to find that the interests of the foreign
jurisdiction are inferior to the forum. The interest analysis could still bar
the application of foreign law, however, because the focus there should be
on the circumstances peculiar to the facts of the case.
Thus, in a case involving a foreign bank secrecy law which blocks the
discovery of information or transmission of documents necessary to
litigation brought in the United States, the shared value approach would
first focus on whether the reasons and policy for the bank secrecy law have,
or would have in similar circumstances, a counterpart in the United States.
The initial trade-off of foreign and domestic interests is avoided. If a
shared value is determined to exist, the foreign secrecy law should apply
unless the foreign interest is demonstrably inferior to the forum interest.
The requirement of "demonstrable inferiority" in the trade-off portion of
68. Abus de droit; analogy to the treatment of pseudo-foreign corporations. See Kaplan, "Foreign
Corporations and Local Corporate Policy" (1968) 21 Vand.L.Rev. 433; Western Airlines Inc. v. Sobieski,
191 Cal. App. 2d 399 (1961).
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the analysis would help prevent undue subjectivity by the forum court in
the balancing of interests. It would also preclude a court from circumvent-
ing the shared value portion of the analysis by giving inordinate weight to
the interests of the forum.
We are forthright in urging the shared values approach as a means to
increase forum court tolerance of discordant foreign laws. The approach
incorporates a quid pro quo attitude; in looking for shared values,
considerations of how the forum jurisdiction would hope to be treated if
the situation were reversed arise. We do, however, recognise that a shared
value approach may, in some cases, result in less tolerance of foreign
mandatory law than would an interest analysis. If no shared values can be
found, resort to an interest analysis would be unnecessary, even though the
balancing of other factors might favour application of foreign law. Thus,
the effect may be to preclude application of foreign law although an
interest analysis would have reversed the decision.
An alternative means of avoiding this prospect is to require an interest
analysis even though no shared values can be found. This approach would
presumably maximise forum deference to foreign laws and guard against
an unduly narrow search for shared values. While the choice is a difficult
one, we would resort to an interest analysis only when shared values in
foreign mandatory rules are found. We question whether deference to a
foreign mandatory law is appropriate unless shared values, as we have
broadly defined them, exist. Application of the laws of State controlled
jurisdictions, where shared values could rarely be found, might be
favoured if an interest analysis inevitably followed the consideration of
shared values. The dominant and pervasive State interest involved might
persuade some courts, under an interest analysis, to apply foreign law
more liberally there than when democratic jurisdictions are involved.
Further, at least with regard to Western countries, we doubt that many
cases exist where an interest analysis would support application of foreign
mandatory law although shared values were lacking.
VII. A GENUINE LINK
ONCE the shared value analysis has demonstrated that a foreign mandatory
law is generally applicable, a genuine link between the involved facts and
the foreign State must be shown to justify application of the foreign law in
the specific instance before the court. The genuine link concept, as
originally articulated in the Nottebohm case,69 places a cognisable limit on
69. Nottebohm Case [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
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the extraterritorial reach of law. It is today recognised as a precondition to
the application of any other State's law.
With regard to bank secrecy laws, we suggest that a genuine link of
sufficient strength exists with the State in which the bank has its seat-that
is, its central administration. Thus, a Swiss bank should be able to invoke
the Swiss bank secrecy law in a jurisdiction foreign to it if the bank secrecy
law meets the standards of the shared value analysis.
An exception should exist for acts done within the forum State, for
example through an agent or subsidiary or through exchange transactions
in the forum State. There the interests of the forum State normally exceed
those of the foreign State irrespective of a shared value analysis. These
genuine link proposals seem to correspond to the approaches governing
testimonial privilege conflicts which, according to the Restatement, should
be governed by the law of the State where the confidential communication
was made.
70
VIII. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW AS FACT
IF foreign law cannot be applied as law because of a lack of a shared value
or of a genuine link, it might nevertheless have a factual influence on the
result of the litigation. Foreign law might for instance make the
performance of an act required under the law of the forum State factually
impossible for the actor. For example, foreign secrecy laws often carry
penal sanctions for disclosure of confidential information. Thus, an
American discovery order requiring confidential information subject to the
foreign law would create hardship against the party having knowledge of
the information. Starting with the Interhandel decision,71 the discussion of
the application of foreign law in the United States has centered largely on
impossibility and hardship. Unfortunately, the analysis has often confused
application of foreign law as law with application of foreign law as fact.72
On this second level, the analysis becomes more subjective and should
focus upon the circumstances of the individual party who faces conflicting
rules. Initially, inquiry should be made as to whether compliance with the
forum's order would result in a penalty abroad. The possibility that the
existing foreign sanction might be waived because of the nature of and
70. Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), Tent. Draft No.3
(1982), sec.419, comment (c); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 391 (D.C.D.C. 1978).
71. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
72. Cf. Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), Tent. Draft No.3
(1982), sec.420, Ic, 2cc; United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1098 (1981).
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hardship created by the forum's order should not be overlooked.73 But the
probability of a harsh foreign sanction does not end the analysis-it ripens
the additional question of risk allocation, that is, should the forum State
bear ultimately the risk of the foreign sanction? It may be that the forum
court will find that the risk should remain where it falls, on the party facing
the conflicting rules. In United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Corp., the
New Mexico Supreme Court correctly placed the risk of non-compliance
on the defendant because the defendant knew that such a conflict could
occur in the context in which it was doing business.74 The court stated that
[wihen a party places documents outside this country with the expectation that
production of those documents will be frustrated in litigation here, the strong policy in
favor of broad discovery dictates that that party bear the consequences of the dilemma
created by the realization of its expectations.
7
Thus the individual or "poor guy"must bear the brunt of the conflict where
he has gambled or knowingly placed himself in a situation where the laws
of two countries conflict.
The private party may, of course, become involved in a conflict situation
unknowingly, either through surprise or the subsequent enactment of
foreign legislation, as for example a blocking statute. But even where an
individual has not knowingly assumed the risk of application of a foreign
law, the forum State may still seek execution of its order. It can be argued
in appropriate cases that the foreign State should relieve the individual of
the burden of the conflict or compensate for damages incurred. If the
foreign State does not want to waive applicability of its law, the conflict
should be resolved between the foreign State and the individual. This
approach is particularly appropriate where the individual is a citizen of the
foreign State.
IX. CONCLUSION
THE external application of a sovereign's laws has creat6d a paradox in the
free world. The paradox is destructive of international relations, economi-
cally and politically. This paper has attempted to delineate a structural and
contextual framework for dealing with the paradox by separating the areas
of conflict and proposing a methodology of analysis for each. A distinction
has been drawn between application of foreign law as law and as fact by
73. See Lowenfeld, "Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Reasonableness: A Reply to A. V. Lowe" (1981) 75
A..I.L. 629, at p.631.
74. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1981), reh. denied, 1980, cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981).
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evoking recent European thought. We have focused our methodology on
an attempt to match the shared values of Western sovereigns in conflict of
laws resolution. The shared values approach incorporates, rather than
precludes, an interest analysis. However, by changing the focus from a
balancing test to a search for common values, the analysis promises to be at
once more tolerant of foreign mandatory laws and more realistic in
assessing the conflict involved.
